Law: Rethinking the Marital Rape Exception in India
This Blog is Written by
Vashishth Anand Choumal, 5th Year, BA LLB, KES’ Shri
Jayantilal H. Patel Law College, Mumbai, & Surbhi Agrawal, 4th Year, BA LLB, KES’ Shri Jayantilal H. Patel Law College, Mumbai.
Blog 13 | Edition VII
The Right to Say No Within Marriage
Consent cannot reasonably be
treated as a one-time decision made at the beginning of a marriage. It is
capable of changing according to circumstances. Consent to one sexual act does
not necessarily amount to consent to another, nor does consent on one occasion
establish consent for the future. Marriage creates mutual obligations, but
those obligations cannot logically amount to permanent control over a spouse's
body. The legal recognition of marriage should not be confused with an
unrestricted entitlement to sexual access. This issue also has a constitutional
dimension. In Joseph Shine v. Union of India, the Supreme Court questioned
patriarchal assumptions that treated women as subordinate within marriage and
emphasised constitutional values of dignity and individual autonomy. The
Court's broader Article 21 jurisprudence has similarly recognised privacy and
personal autonomy as important aspects of personal liberty. Sexual choices are
among the most intimate decisions an individual can make. Consequently, the
question of consent within marriage cannot be separated from the constitutional
value of bodily autonomy.
The Misuse Debate in Criminalising Marital Rape
A balanced discussion must
acknowledge the concern that criminalising marital rape could lead to false or
exaggerated allegations. Criminal proceedings can seriously affect liberty,
reputation and family life, making fair investigation and due process essential.
However, the possibility of misuse does not, by itself, justify denying legal
protection to an entire category of persons. The better response may lie in
safeguards such as impartial investigation, careful assessment of evidence and
protection against malicious prosecution. Protecting the complainant's dignity
and protecting the accused's right to a fair trial are not mutually exclusive
objectives. The law must also distinguish genuine sexual violence from ordinary
matrimonial disagreements. Criminal law should address coercion and
non-consensual sexual conduct without transforming every marital conflict into
a criminal proceeding.
Beyond the Marital Rape Exception: The Scope of Criminal Liability
The BNS itself demonstrates that
marital status does not provide absolute protection in every circumstance.
Section 67 specifically criminalises sexual intercourse by a husband with his
wife during separation when it occurs without her consent. This distinction
raises an important question. If the law recognises the significance of consent
when spouses are living separately, why should the legal significance of
consent disappear merely because the spouses continue to live together? The
issue becomes even more complex where non-consensual sexual conduct causes
serious bodily injury or death. The question is then not limited to whether
such conduct constitutes rape; it also concerns whether marital status can
shield independently punishable criminal conduct.
The Constitutional Question of Marital Autonomy
The judiciary must nevertheless
remain conscious of the separation of powers. Defining criminal offences is
primarily a legislative function, while constitutional courts determine whether
legislation is consistent with fundamental rights. The marital rape debate
therefore requires a careful balance between individual autonomy, equality,
dignity, legislative policy and institutional limits. The question is not
simply whether criminalisation is morally desirable, but whether the existing
distinction created by the law can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Conclusion
The marital rape exception reflects
a continuing tension between traditional notions of marital entitlement and the
constitutional recognition of individual autonomy. Protecting marriage as an
institution does not require treating it as a source of permanent sexual
consent. Marriage creates a legal relationship between two individuals; it does
not erase their separate identities, dignity or bodily autonomy. Consent, by
its very nature, must remain voluntary and capable of being withheld or
withdrawn. The constitutional question is therefore not whether to protect
marriage or individual rights, but whether both can coexist without making one
spouse's autonomy conditional upon marital status. Ultimately, marriage may
create companionship, commitment and mutual responsibility, but it cannot
create permanent sexual entitlement. A person's refusal cannot become legally
irrelevant merely because the relationship is marital. Protecting the
institution of marriage must not come at the cost of protecting the individual
within it.
(Write to the authors at vashishthchowmal16@gmail.com & surbhiagrawal2003@gmail.com.)

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